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Abstract. This paper is part of a broader project that attempts to gener-
ate microfoundations for macroeconomics as an emergent property of complex
systems. The multi-agents systems approach is seen to produce realistic macro
properties from a primitive set of agents that search for satisfactory activities,
￿jobs￿, in an informationally constrained, computationally noisy environment.
There is frictional and structural unemployment, in￿ation, excess capacity, ￿-
nancial instability along with the possibility of relatively smooth expansion.
There is no Phillips curve but an inegalitarian distribution of income emerges
as fundamental property of the system.
1. Introduction
This paper is part of a broader project that attempts to generate a microeconomic
basis for macroeconomics as an emergent property of complex systems
1. It is il-
lustrated with a simple agent-based model written in NetLogo, a Java-based code
for multi-agent system modeling2. Agents are buyers and sellers of labor services,
embedded in a landscape or grid, and negotiate deals that may or may not result
in production3. Natural selection is at work for buyers in that if they raise their
output prices, they increase the probability that they can be eliminated through
competition. Sellers must also respect a survival constraint on total wealth. The
model is not comprehensive and does not capture the full range of market activi-
ties in either the standard Walrasian or Keynesian economic frameworks. It does
not, for example, include the formation of coalitions of agents in ￿rms or employee
organizations. Instead, the paper approaches the problem of microfoundations for
macroeconomics from a more primitive perspective, that of agents searching for
satisfactory activities, ￿jobs￿ , in an informationally constrained, computationally
yVersion: 1.02. September 2007; John Converse Professor of Economics, University of
Vermont, Burlington, VT 045405 and Professor of Public Policy and Economics, Univer-
sity of Massachusetts, Amherst, MA 01003 USA 413-548-9448. wgibson@econs.umass.edu;
http://people.umass.edu/wgibson.
Key words and phrases. Multi-agent system, agent-based models, microeconomic foundations,
macroeconomics. JEL codes D58, D83, D30.
Thanks to Diane Flaherty for comments on an earlier version of this paper.
1See for example (Brock and Durlauf, 2005) and (Gatti et al., 2008).
2See (Railsback et al., 2007) for a review of various platforms available for Multi-Agent System
modeling. This paper does not compare, however, ODML, the system designed by Lessor et al.,
at the Multi-Agent Systems Laboratory at the University of Massachusetts at Amherst. NetLogo
is from (Wilensky, 1998). The model of this paper is similar to the Sugarscape model of (Epstein
and Axtell, 1996).
3See (Axelrod and Benett, 1997) for a discussion of landscape models.
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noisy environment. The properties that emerge from the model are many of the
standard macroeconomic features one would expect. There is frictional and struc-
tural unemployment, in￿ ation, excess capacity and ￿nancial instability. It is further
seen that an inegalitarian distribution of wealth is deeply embedded in even this
primitive economy, since agents who ￿nd good jobs early and keep them are con-
sistently wealthier than those who engage in costly search. This result seems to
be independent of the initial distribution of wealth across agents.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the multi-agent sys-
tems approach, relating it to some of the broad themes of economics and science
generally. Section 3 discusses the layout of the model, its adjustment mechanisms
and the simulation procedure. The fourth section provides some numerical aggre-
gates that are the model￿ s macroeconomic properties. A concluding section sum-
marizes the main ￿ndings of the paper4.
2. The multi-agent systems approach
Multi-agent systems, also known as agent-based models, address one of the most
fundamental problems in social science: the relationship between structure and
individual agency (Axelrod, 1984). The long-run character of an economy is de-
termined principally by agency, but in the short run, decisions made in the past
present themselves in the form of structural constraints (Durlaf and Young, 2001).
In economics, the multi-agent problem was originally framed in the language of
game theory and many useful analytical results have been derived. But multi-
agent analytical models are limited in institutional speci￿city and typically fail to
capture combinatorily rich environments that even simple multi-agent systems can
easily produce5.
In science generally the approach has its roots in the late nineteenth century
statistical mechanics of Gibbs, Boltzmann and Maxwell (Durlauf, 1999). Physics
sought to explain macro properties of gases, temperature and pressure already
described by the perfect gas law, in terms of the trajectories of individual mole-
cules
6. This statistical approach proved to be fundamental in the evolution of the
quantum theory at the beginning of the next century, with the development of the
idea of a probability wave to describe the position of an electron and beta decay of
a neutron into a proton and neutrino. With the development of statistical thermo-
dynamics, the macro approach to the theoretical behavior of molecular aggregates
was all but abandoned.
4The NetLogo code is not included in this version of the paper, but is available from the author
upon request.
5Stated formally, the question is: what is the joint probability distribution for the entire sto-
chastic path that is compatible with the conditional probability distributions for each agent? Since
the answer to this question is largely beyond conventional inductive and deductive approaches, re-
searchers have turned to simulation methods, or what Axelrod calls a ￿third way of doing science￿
(Aexlrod, 1997), (Berry et al., 2002).
6Maxwell famously argued, by implication, that an individual atom could have no
temperature. It was not a question of measurement, but rather derivative of the notion of heat as
the energy released in collisions of individual atomic masses. Since one atom, or agent, could not
collide with itself, it was meaningless to ask how hot it was. Writing to Wolfgang Pauli, Maxwell
went further to argue that like temperature and pressure, time and space ￿are really only statis-
tical concepts.￿(Johnson, 1995, p. 1).
See also (Durlauf, 1999) for a discussion of the relationship between statistical mechanics and
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More than a century later, economics is grappling with its own version of the
uni￿cation of micro and macro principles. Keynesian macroeconomic theory, under
sustained attack since the 1970s both on empirical and theoretical grounds, has also
been largely abandoned. Much of what is considered to be the reason for the decline
of Keynesian macroeconomics is the unstable relationship between employment and
in￿ ation that was supposedly exploitable along the Phillips curve
...the in￿ ationary bias on average of monetary and ￿scal policy [in
the 1970s] should...have produced the lowest average unemploy-
ment rates for any decade since the 1940s. In fact, as we know,
they produced the highest unemployment since the 1930s. This
was economic failure on a grand scale (Lucas and Sargent, 1978,
p 277).
The theoretical foundations of Keynesian theory were also weak. Sonnenschein,
Mantel and Debreu convincingly demonstrated that the n-agent Walrasian model
of general economic equilibrium could not provide microfoundations for one-sector
macroeconomics7. Analysts seem to be left with the infelicitous choice between a
workable but untethered macroeconomics and a coherent, but necessarily unrealistic
and for the most part barren microeconomic alternative.
Since the early 1990s, the multi-agent systems or agent-based modeling literature
has provided an alternative modeling framework for studying economies and forms
of social organization. Multi-agent models are typically based on cellular automata
in which agents interact with their immediate neighbors, de￿ned by common edges
or corners, and may use sophisticated learning algorithms derived from research in
arti￿cial intelligence (AI).
Wooldridge notes that multi-agent systems (1) are capable of suggesting re-
sults that can later be established analytically or experimentally; (2) can allow
researchers to study events that are either dangerous, expensive or unethical to
reproduce; (3) do not involve the loss of information from the use of ￿representa-
tive agents,￿the behavior of which averages important, underlying heterogeneity;
(4) allow the study of problems that are beyond the grasp of either analytical,
statistical or qualitative analysis (Wooldridge, 2002).
The clearest example of how these bene￿ts present is also one of the earliest, due
to Schelling (Schelling, 1971). Shelling￿ s original neighborhood model envisioned
a checkerboard, in which interior agents are surrounded by eight neighbors. Each
agent￿ s decision rule is simple; when a threshold of racial density is surpassed, an
agent relocates to some randomly chosen location. This simple rule can lead this
system to regular behavior. Although each agent prefers to live in a mixed neigh-
borhood, after several iterations the neighborhoods are entirely segregated. This
is an emergent property of the model, as when ice forms from the interaction of
hydrogen and oxygen at zero degrees Celsius, ￿the product of the complex interac-
tion of elementary particles that could not have been predicted on the basis of the
properties of the particles alone￿(Anderson, 1972).
Simple reactive systems were only the ￿rst step in the development of vastly
more complex systems in which agents could compute decision trees, through for-
mal Markov decision processes or informal heuristics, communicate and negotiate
7See (Debreu, 1974). For an interpretation of SMD theory, see (Rizvi, 1997) and (Rizvi, 1994).4 BILL GIBSON
among themselves to form coalitions, teams and blocs, formulate and test hypothe-
ses about their environment and other agents￿behavior, adapt to dynamically evolv-
ing environments, self-organize, develop error tolerance and resistance to attack8.
In short, all the AI features that currently drive robotics, large-scale and complex
organizational tasks, such as the air-tra¢ c control system and distributed sensor
and information retrieval networks can be built into multi-agent systems.
Generally, data structures representing individual agents are instantiated and
then allowed to pursue their own objectives interactively, with incomplete infor-
mation about the environment. System-wide regularities then emerge, despite the
absence of governing equations for the social system as a whole (Axtell, 1999).
2.1. Structure and assumptions of the model. In their survey of multi-agent
organizational paradigms, Horling and Lesser note that ￿an organization of a multi-
agent system is the collection of roles, relationships, and authority structures which
govern its behavior￿ (Horling and Lesser, 2005). A market is one of the organi-
zational structures considered in that paper, in which buyers and sellers agree
to a binding exchange contract9. Classically, markets consist of real-time entities,
individuals or groups, which coordinate the activities of participating groups of
agents. More realistically, a market is simply a set of bilateral negotiations between
two agents that may or may not be conclusive. If not, a new round of negotiations
with the same, or indeed di⁄erent, participants can follow ad in￿nitum. Markets
are not, therefore, primitives in multi-agent systems but can arise as a form of
multi-agent organization as Horling and Lesser have noted and others have worked
out in detail (Cheng and Wellman, 1998). The speci￿cation of the negotiation
process, how it begins and concludes, is logically prior to the particular organiza-
tional form that evolves from the interaction of agents. Similarly, ￿rms need not be
primitives. A production process operated by agents may be a more natural way
to conceptualize production. Firms are then statistical aggregations of production
processes that obtain as a result of decision-making at a more fundamental level,
that of the agents themselves10.
Like the de￿nition of a ￿rm, the traditional categories of classical political econ-
omy are not fundamental to multi-agent systems. Agents are not identi￿ed as
￿workers￿ or ￿capitalists,￿ that is, with ￿xed social roles. The other extreme is
the Walrasian ￿atomistic agents￿ who make decisions in isolated environments.
Most of the multi-agent literature drops both of these extreme assumptions, how-
ever. Abdulla and Lesser, for example, show how agents can learn through runtime
communication to form e⁄ective dynamic coalitions through self-organization (Ab-
dallah and Lesser, 2007). Even Cheng and Wellman, who make every e⁄ort to
replicate the Walrasian in their model have trading out of equilibrium undertaken
by asynchronous agents11 (Cheng and Wellman, 1998).
8The literature not already cited is immense. A good introduction is (Wooldridge, 2002) and
the references cited therein. See also (Epstein and Axtell, 1996) for a good introduction.
9Markets emerge naturally in agent-based models and much of the early work in the ￿eld was
devoted to how they come about. See (Arthur et al., 1997) and (Cheng and Wellman, 1998)
10For a thorough discussion of an agent-based model in which ￿rms are endogenously generated,
see (Axtell, 1999). There ￿rms play an important role by preventing agents from defecting, thereby
allowing the ￿rm to move to Pareto superior allocation.
11Most multi-agent models celebrate the heterogeneity of their agents, as does this one. See
in particular (Gatti et al., 2008).MAS APPROACH TO MICRO FOUNDATIONS 5
Agents in multi-agent systems are best thought of as computational entities who
make decisions based in an informationally constrained environment and with lim-
ited computational means in real time. In their review of the relationship between
AI and economics, Boutilier, Shoham and Wellman note
Although modeling computational entities as rational beings is
standard AI practice we do not generally have the luxury of as-
suming rationality. It is our burden to explain how to realize ap-
proximately rational behaviors in operational computational terms
(Boutilier et al., 1997, p 2).
Since computation itself requires real time, agents must cease their computational
e⁄ort within an action frame of the model.
Many, if not most, real-world problems are computationally hard with no guar-
antee that an optimal solution can be found12. Sandholm and Lessor note that the
problem of vehicle routing from only ￿ve dispatch centers becomes so large that an
agent￿ s rationality is limited by computational complexity
13. Heuristic, satis￿cing
algorithms replace optimal ones in multi-agent systems and it is the combined ac-
tivity of imprecise calculations that de￿ne bounded rationality. In most multi-agent
models sub-game perfect strategies, as are present in analytical games, are beyond
the reach of agents.
2.2. Model speci￿cs. Following Lesser and Horling, agents are ￿rst categorized
according to their role. In the model of this paper, two roles, buyer and seller of
labor services, are de￿ned. Agents move from one location on a ￿xed grid. The role
of the agent is to sell her labor services to a cell and the role of a cell is to combine
labor and capital to produce output. Thus, cells are also agents, but to prevent
terminological confusion, we restrict the use of the term ￿agent￿to apply only to
the mobile subset of agents. Cells in the grid will be referred to simply as cells and
not agents.
The key decision is whether to produce. Cells and agents communicate informa-
tion bilaterally in an e⁄ort to decide whether a deal can be struck that would allow
output to be produced and agents to be compensated. The most important compo-
nent of the cell-agent relationship is simply their collocation. Cells cannot produce
without an agent present and agents cannot produce without cells. Moreover, to
have the authority to produce cells must obtain ￿nancing from other agents. The
aggregate supply of credit is determined by the sum of agent wealth. Agents as
a whole thus own the cells as a whole but since there are many more cells than
agents, cells compete for agents within this authority structure by which they are
de￿ned.
12Only the simplest games, such as tick-tack-toe and more recently checkers with its decision
space on the order of magnitude of 520 can be solved computationally and these only when no
strategic error is made as the game is played in real time. See (Schae⁄er et al., 2007).
13See (Sandholm and Lesser, 1997). Thus, the problem is N ￿ P complete, meaning that
it cannot be solved by any known algorithm by a deterministic (i.e., normal) computer using
resources (time and memory space) that are linked by way of a polynomial expression to a measure
of the size of the input-data (here the ￿ve sensors). The traveling salesman problem is another
example of an N ￿ P complete problem. There is no guarantee that we might not just ￿search
forever￿for the solution.6 BILL GIBSON
Mobile agents search for jobs that satisfy their consumption demands, the latter
of which are randomly assigned. There is no traditional consumption function link-
ing demand to income or wealth. Instead, agents adjust their consumption/wealth
balance through their choice of economic activity. Some agents become wealthy
by saving large fractions of their income. Other agents live beyond their means,
spending down inherited or previously accumulated wealth. The latter move from
job to job searching for a position that will support their lifestyles. This cannot go
on forever; if wealth goes negative, agents leave the grid (die or emigrate). When
an insolvent agent departs she must be replaced by another. A new entrant into
the labor market comes with a fraction of some other agent￿ s wealth. Consumption
demand is also inherited from that ￿parent￿ and scaled to the level of inherited
wealth received by the o⁄spring. Over time, consumption for the society as whole is
altered through a Darwinian selection process to become more consistent with the
level and distribution of wealth. The model also allows for net population growth
at an exogenously speci￿ed rate.
Agents￿characteristics include job satisfaction, a variable that measures whether
current consumption expenses are covered by wage income. Agents wish to accu-
mulate wealth for retirement and to endow their o⁄spring; hence, any job that does
not cover current consumption expenses interrupts the accumulation of wealth and
is judged unsatisfactory. An agent whose job satisfaction is zero will, most likely,
move to search for a better job, one that will cover current expenses so that wealth
accumulation can proceed. Moving to another job is risky however and must be
supported by a minimum ratio of wealth to current expenses. Agents can therefore
get ￿stuck￿in unsatisfactory jobs because they cannot a⁄ord to search for better
ones.
Cells are best conceived as blueprints for technologies that can be activated by
the presence of an agent. A cell blueprint speci￿es the amount of capital to be
used in conjunction with the present agent and gives the details of the output,
marginal product of capital and labor. Since only one agent can produce on one
cell at a time, the amount of capital called for by the blueprint is also the capital-
labor ratio for that cell. Price, wage and pro￿t are determined by way of cell-
agent communication, following a Nash-bargaining procedure, as discussed in detail
below. To render the problem more precisely, we say that blueprints for technologies
are initially distributed over the cells in a random fashion and are characterized by
qi = qi(ki;￿i)
with cell index i = 1;2;:::;n: Here n is the default setting of the software, 2601. The
q function denotes the technology, ki the capital stock and ￿i a share parameter
that controls marginal productivity. Thus, q and k are per-capita levels of output
and capital respectively. Consistent with the quantity of capital assigned randomly








= (1 ￿ ￿)q
for a Cobb-Douglas production function. The initial price is set at unity, but
changes as described below. The wage o⁄er by cell is initially set randomly accord-
ing to
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The capital market is endogenous to the model. The supply of capital is simply
the sum of real wealth owned by agents as the result of previous production and
consumption decisions. The demand for capital is the sum of capital speci￿ed by all
the blueprints of cells with agents present. Those cells that are the most creditwor-
thy obtain ￿nancing and produce; those that cannot obtain ￿nancing are eliminated
through a process of natural selection, outsourced for short. Agents whose jobs have
been outsourced will move from that cell to another in the next action frame of the
simulation.
If an agent is present on a cell and there is su¢ cient ￿nance to enable production,
cells do not have the authority to refuse to produce. Some cells have very low levels
of capital, however, and the production processes they support may pay a wage
that does not meet the agent￿ s reservation wage, de￿ned as the wage that covers
their expenses. Since it is not within the cell￿ s authority to shut down, it will agree
to the agent￿ s wage demand and raise its price so that the product wage equals
the marginal product speci￿ed in its blueprint. In e⁄ect, cells and agents play an
ultimatum game imposed by the runtime clock (G￿th et al., 1982). Cells face a
payo⁄ of zero if they do not produce, so if the maximum wage o⁄er, ￿ w; is less than
the agent￿ s reservation wage, the cell meets the wage demand but raises its price
until equation 2.1 holds. System-wide in￿ ation results and the average real wage
for all agents then falls. In the following period, all agents revise their reservation
wages to take into account the higher aggregate price level.
Wealth maximizing agents are always better o⁄ to accept any wage since their
option is zero income for that period and a decline in their wealth by the value
of consumption expenses. Experimental results in ultimatum games show that
not all agents behave according to the principles of classical rationality however
(Henrich et al., 2004). Thus, it is within the authority of an agent to refuse a valid
wage o⁄er. Some agents, referred to here as ￿militants￿ , punish the cell for what
the agent deems as an ￿unfair￿division of output. The agent does not know its
marginal product and therefore cannot determine what the cell can a⁄ord to pay.
From the punisher￿ s perspective, the ￿ w agreement is only marginally acceptable and
some fraction will reject the o⁄er and move on. The cell then forfeits its ￿nancing
and does not produce14. Note that it may well be that militant behavior leads to
further search and possibly a better job that would not have otherwise obtained.
It is a precarious strategy for a cell to raise its price from the perspective of its
own survival. Aggregate wealth is a constraint on total capital formation and the
algorithm that allocates ￿nance takes into account pro￿tability in additional to a
random error term. A cell that pays the full marginal product of labor thus risks
cell death since it will be the least creditworthy. If the minimum wage demand
increases because of induced in￿ ation or life-cycle factors discussed below, the cell
must then attract net investment (gross investment less depreciation). If the cell is
successful, its marginal product of labor will rise with the new capital and it will
be able to meet the higher wage demand. If not, the agent will likely move to take
a better job o⁄er elsewhere.
14Militants serve a progressive social purpose, however, preventing technologically weak cells
from using scarce capital. Unless capital is abundant, cells whose blueprints do not allow a wage
that would be acceptable to most agents, become prime candidates for outsourcing. Militants
serve an additional social purpose in keeping in￿ation down since ￿rms do not then raise their
prices to accommodate a wage demand. On the other hand, had the militant accepted the job,
total wealth would have increased and more capital would have been available for the next period.8 BILL GIBSON
2.3. Education, mobility and collisions. Agents move in this model for ￿ve
reasons: (1) the agent is dissatis￿ed with the job; (2) the job has been outsourced;
(3) a better o⁄er arises; (4) the agent is not dissatis￿ed, but wishes to experiment;
(5) the agent quits or completes school. This section deals with the third motivation.
At any point in time, an agent in any one cell is immediately surrounded by at
most eight other technologies, four of which are on cardinal headings and four that
are not. Depending on the initial parameters, good jobs, those that o⁄er a wage
greater than current consumption expenses, may be abundant or not. If there are
not many good jobs, some of the eight cells may well be empty.
Assume for the moment that an agent can only see four of the technologies that
immediately surround her, those on the cardinal headings. Thus, an agent might
be close to a good job, but not be able to ￿see￿ it. The agent decides whether
to move as a result of computing the highest wage of these four cells it can see.
If the highest wage is greater than the current wage, and the agent￿ s wealth to
expense is above an exogenously set minimum, then the probability of movement
increases. There is also the possibility that the agent will not match the skill or
educational requirements for the job. The agent does not know what the employer
￿really wants￿in an applicant. If a degree is required, for example, then an under-
educated agent will be turned away and the cell will be unable to produce.
An agent￿ s ability to see jobs ahead is a function of educational. At birth, agents
are assigned a random variable for their level of education. After four years of
education, agents graduate and can compete for higher paying jobs. With two
years of education, agents can see into the second ring of cells around their position
and with three jobs three rings and so on15. Graduate status confers an additional
bene￿t on an agent that enables her to see jobs on a randomized non-cardinal search
heading.
Since education enhances the ability of an agent to ￿nd a good job, agents may
elect to return to school for more education if their current job is unsatisfactory.
The choice involves an opportunity cost of foregone wages as well as a direct school
cost that is set parametrically as a fraction of agent￿ s wealth16. Only those agents
who can a⁄ord to return to school do so. An agent must meet an exogenously set
minimum ratio of wealth to expenses before returning to school and this ratio is
a function of the years remaining to graduation. If an agent￿ s rate of return falls
while in school, it is possible that she would have to leave17.
15As the distance to a job becomes greater, the cardinal heading restriction reduces the proba-
bility of seeing a job signi￿cantly. Four of the eight immediate cells are visible, but of the sixteen
cells surrounding the immediate eight, only four of those are visible and thus the probability drops
from ￿fty-￿fty for the ￿rst eight surrounding cells to 0.25 for the second ring and so on.
16Note that there is a social cost of education in the model that might not be immediately
apparent. Since the sum of agent wealth determines the amount of capital that can be ￿nanced,
a decision by an agent to return to school causes a reduction in both aggregate wealth and capital
stock. The capital stock is immediately reduced since the cell cannot produce when the agent is in
school. Thus if the percentage of wealth of the agent that goes to ￿nance her education is greater
than the capital stock of the cell which has been abandoned, aggregate capital decreases (through
outsourcing) and production falls. When agents with low paying, under capitalized jobs decide to
return to school and wealth decreases, the capital market can tighten and the unemployment can
spread as some processes are outsourced. On the other hand, education bene￿ts the economy as
a whole, by possibly enabling technologies that, while available and would pay high wages, cannot
be used because of a shortage of graduates.
17She can also ￿￿unk out￿with an exogenously set probability.MAS APPROACH TO MICRO FOUNDATIONS 9
If agent density is high, more than one agent can arrive on a cell at any given time
in the simulation. If there is a collision, the cell will employ the most highly skilled
agent. Skill is a quadratic function of age, experience, local experience (in a given
cell) and education. The functional form insures that aging workers eventually lose
their advantage, for the same level of education, to younger workers, as both grow
older. Local experience in the current cell is also speci￿ed. When an agent moves,
local experience is set to zero; but if an agent remains in a job, her skill variable
accumulates rapidly. From the cell￿ s point of view, the agent is increasingly suited
to her job relative to a competitor.
2.4. Nash bargaining. When agents move, they move to the cell with the best
advertised o⁄er, where the best o⁄er is determined by how far an agent can see
from its starting cell. Agents then Nash bargain with cells over the wage payment.
The agent￿ s bargaining strength relies on the cell￿ s marginal bene￿t of having an
agent present. The agent knows that if he refuses the wage-o⁄er, the cell will have
no other option than shutting down. Conversely the cell is aware that if the agent
refuses the o⁄er, there will be no production and the agent￿ s wealth will decline by
his consumption expense for the period.
The surplus in cell i, Si, is de￿ned as the di⁄erence between the marginal product





If this surplus is positive then Nash bargaining proceeds, but if Si is zero or negative,
then the cell￿ s only option is to meet the wage demand, cj: If the agent is militant
the o⁄er is rejected; if not, then it is accepted.
If the surplus is positive, the standard solution to the Nash bargaining problem
has the share of the surplus determined by the impatience of the agent, with im-
patience measured by the agent￿ s discount rate. Here we substitute the agent￿ s
wealth-to-expense ratio under the assumption that if wealth will be consumed
quickly, agents are more willing to accept a low o⁄er and vice-versa. The e⁄ect
is moderated by ￿rst taking the natural log of the wealth-to-expense ratio and then
computing the share of the surplus, ￿i; by way of a logistic function L, such that
￿i = L(Wi=ci)
where Wi is the wealth of the ith agent. The share function is shown in ￿gure 1
The Nash bargaining scheme is a mechanism to determine the ￿nal wage paid
and may or may not be realistic. Skillman notes, for example, that the process un-
realistically implies that outside o⁄ers continuously a⁄ect the bargaining outcome.
This is inconsistent with the data for most countries at the aggregate level and
challenges a sense of microeconomic realism. Skillman￿ s solution is to introduce
￿endogenous termination￿in which any participant can terminate the bargaining
at any moment18. Endogenous termination is only e⁄ective when the outside o⁄er
improves on the solution for the agent and therefore smooths wage determination.
Note that in the multi-agent systems approach, problems arising from analytical
simpli￿cation, such as those identi￿ed by Skillman, are resolved naturally by the
sequential nature of the model. The code is constructed such that at the end of each
18Exogenous termination requires that bargaining comes to end in an exogenously speci￿ed
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Figure 1. Share of surplus in the Nash bargaining problem
period every agent must bargain anew with its cell for a share of the production of
the coming period19. Prior to bargaining, however, the agent is given an opportunity
to move to a new cell. If the agent remains on its current cell, again by de￿nition
the outside o⁄ers are irrelevant since they are lower. On the other hand if the
agent moves, outside o⁄ers were clearly relevant and endogenously terminated the
bargaining on the previous cell. In any given period, then, agents Nash bargain
without continuous interference from outside o⁄ers
20.
2.5. Life cycle. Agents live a randomly assigned number of years between the
minimum life-span and the maximum. Both are set exogenously and after reaching
the end of their given life-span, agents die. Population grows exogenously in the
model with new agents appearing discretely as the ￿children￿of an existing agent,
randomly selected
21. Parents transfer a randomized percentage between 20 and 80
19That agents must Nash bargain at the beginning of each period is not as unrealistic as it
may at ￿rst appear. It does not, for example, generate noisy wages. Consider an agent who
bargains over the wage for a second year of employment with a cell. If the agent￿ s wage just
covers expenses, wealth would remain ￿xed and ignoring for the moment any change in expenses,
the share of surplus ￿ would remain constant. The wage would then follow capital accumulation.
Collisions might cause wages to change abruptly, but since skill depends on ￿experience here,￿it
is di¢ cult for one agent to unseat another even if the interloper is more broadly experienced or
more educated.
20Imagine that an agent moves from a cell in a neighborhood with little capital to a cell on the
fringes of an economic opportunity zone. The assumption implies that a superior environment
will not a⁄ect the agent￿ s bargained share of the surplus until the following period.
21Children enter the world at 15 years old with a randomly assigned level of education and
no job experience. Consequently, their bargaining share is low, especially when they inherit an
extravagant lifestyle from their parent.MAS APPROACH TO MICRO FOUNDATIONS 11
percent of their wealth their o⁄spring. The rest of their wealth is lost to consump-
tion in the period of transfer, spent on transaction costs for services, funeral, legal
and the like. These services are provided by existing technologies and no other
adjustment need be made.
If the agent is educated, both human and physical capital can be lost at the
time of agent death. Output can fall if the replacement agent is poorly educated,
has no degree or must compete for a job with another agent who is more skilled
or experienced. If the agent cannot ￿nd work, aggregate wealth falls and rate of
growth of the capital stock declines.
2.6. Reinforcement learning and mobility. If wage income falls below con-
sumption expenses, agents become unsatis￿ed with their current jobs and may
begin a search for a new one. But agents may also move even if they are satis￿ed
with their current jobs, but wish to explore the map of the environment and its
associated rewards
22. In simple reinforcement learning models, the value function
is an aggregator of rewards as they accrue to a speci￿c agent. The decision to move
increases the agent￿ s knowledge of the value function. The simplest response is that
if the value function is rising, the probability that an agent will move in the next
period, even if satis￿ed with her job, increases. Agents update the value function
using the simple algorithm
Vt+1 = ￿m (Vt+1 ￿ Vt) + Vt
where V is the value function and ￿m is 1 if the agent moves and 0 if not. Here
the value function is the surplus of wage income over living expenses. If the agent￿ s
move is associated with improvement in the value function, then the probability of
moving in the future is increased. Agent mobility, M; is the given by the logistic
function of the current value.
2.7.
Mt = L(Vt)
Dynamics. There is no investment function in the model as traditionally de￿ned,
but, as noted, the sum of value of the capital stock must be equal to total agent
real wealth. Cells operating processes more pro￿table than average are able to ￿nd
￿nancing to expand their production while those that are less pro￿table are less
likely. If cells cannot attract capital, depreciation will cause the maximum wage to
fall, lowering the surplus and creating the conditions for agents to depart. As noted
above, cells have an initially assigned demand for capital stock level consistent with
their technology. If activated by the presence of an agent, the capital stock must
be ￿nanced out of the total wealth of agents. If total wealth is less then the value
of the capital stock, some processes are outsourced. The choice of which cell is to
shut down and go abroad is made by ranking pro￿tability along with a random
error term.
If total wealth exceeds the sum of the activated capital stock, investment takes
place on the ith producing cell according to the Gibbs-Boltzmann distribution of
22In the AI literature, agents are either a ￿greedy￿ or ￿exploratory￿ in their choices (Sutton
and Barto, 1998). Note the subtle di⁄erence in terminology relative to the way the word greedy







where ￿ is the current rate of pro￿t and ￿ is a parameter of the distribution. A
uniformly distributed random error term, ￿i; with mean of zero and weight ￿ is
added so that the pattern of investment is not strictly determined by pro￿tability.
Nevertheless, more pro￿table cells receive, on average, higher shares of available
￿nancing.
High pro￿tability on cells results from the combination of a large capital stock
together with a low reservation wage. Cells with a minimal endowment of capital
stock cannot pay high wages and therefore must either raise their prices or hope to
￿nd an agent with modest consumption expenses. Since this is sometimes possible,
it follows that there can be discontinuous departures from any implicit balanced
growth path, departures in which small but highly pro￿table cells occasionally
experience explosive growth.
The model can easily produce unstable dynamics as a result. If a cell￿ s share
in new ￿nance is less than depreciation, the capital stock will fall and eventually
disappear. Any resident agent would most likely leave before the capital stock was
exhausted, but then other agents could arrive and force the cell to raise its price.
Since such agent-cell combinations produce no net increase in total wealth, yet draw
on capital, they can easily lead to outsourcing. This in turn reduces wealth further,
along an unstable branch.
2.8. Con￿ ict. Nothing in the model prevents two or more agents from arriving
on the same cell23. The cell queries the agents in residence and makes a list of
quali￿ed applicants, depending on whether a graduate is required. The cell then
selects the most skilled of these agents and Nash bargains over the wage rate. If
the surplus is negative, the cell would still prefer to produce and raise its price,
as discussed above. But in the case in which more than one quali￿ed applicant is
available, the cell assigns a ￿rejected￿code to the agent with a negative surplus
and then Nash bargains with the runner up, the next most skilled. This is an
improved survival strategy for the cell since the chance that it will be a victim of
outsourcing is reduced. If the Nash bargaining fails with all quali￿ed applicants,
the cell searches for the cheapest of the rejected candidates, pays the reservation
wage and raise the price to compensate. If the candidate is a punisher, however,
the cell may o⁄er the reservation wage and ￿nd that it is rejected. In this case the
cell, fails to produce, just as above
24.
2.9. Program ￿ ow. The program is structured as follows. Agents are endowed
with a given amount of wealth and cells are given blueprints. At the opening bell,
every agent must strike a deal with the cell on which it resides. If the deal is
successfully concluded, there is production and income is distributed. Each agent￿ s
age, wealth, experience, education, mobility, skill, probability of going back to
school, impatience and job satisfaction are then updated. Cell capital stock is
23If n agents occupy the same cell, and m < n make a decision to return to school, the program
prevents the cell from becoming a school and thereby depriving the n ￿ m agents of a job. The
m agents must move, thereby postponing their decision to return to school by one period.
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Figure 2. Initial wage distribution (n = 2601)
then adjusted according to the balance of wealth and activated capital. If the net
capital stock rises, the maximum wage increases with the marginal product and vice-
versa. The surplus is then updated to re￿ ect these changes and adjustments to the
reservation wage, if any. On the basis of this new distribution of job opportunities,
agents decide whether to move or stay in their current location. The model then
repeats.
3. Simulation results
The model is initialized with a population of 48 (and a growth rate of 1.5%),
depreciation of 4%, maximum education of 4 and a distribution of good jobs that
resembles ￿gure 2
25. School cost is 6% of wealth per year and cells without agents
raise their wage o⁄ers by 1% per period until either they attract an agent or the
maximum wage is reached. The initial distribution is set such that 25% of the cells
are de￿ned as good jobs, with a wage o⁄er equal to its maximum wage. These
are di⁄used to create economic opportunity zones
26. Initially all agents have the
same wealth and their living expenses average about 1.5 with a standard deviation
of 0.34. There are enough productive technologies to ensure job satisfaction for
all agents although agents may not have su¢ cient education to see them. Indeed,
randomly placing 48 agents on 2601 cells yields a probability of job-satisfaction of
less than a third. Life expectancy is set at 72 with minimum of 50. Expenses grow
25Both a power law and exponential distribution were ￿tted for comparison but the exponential
seems to produce a better ￿t. Axtell shows that the distribution of ￿rms is closer to a power law
than an exponential (Axtell, 1999).
26After the initial distribution of wages, 25% of the wage is spread to a neighbor. This is





















Figure 3. Real wage and number of moves
with age with an elasticity of one to maximum at retirement age of 61 and then
decline
27.
3.1. Unemployment, in￿ ation and job satisfaction. Unemployment in the
model is mostly frictional in that there are no cyclical e⁄ects that are imposed
on the model from outside. The standard explanation for cyclical unemployment
is that the demand for labor increases, driving down the rate of pro￿t and thus
investment. Aggregate demand falls, unemployment rises and output contracts,
causing a multiplier e⁄ect on aggregate demand that reduces it even further. Un-
employment slows wage increases and thus in￿ ation. Thus, in￿ ation and cyclical
unemployment should not coexist, as noted above, but rather trade-o⁄ along the
conventional Phillips curve. Figure 3 depicts the relationship between the average
real wage and number of agent moves per period.
There are no cycles here because aggregate demand as such plays no independent
role in this model. In￿ ation arises in the model because there is a mismatch be-
tween wage demands and the marginal product of labor in a given cell. The con￿ ict
between wage expectations and the ability to meet those wage demands drives in￿ a-
tion, but the overall level of unemployment has no e⁄ect on the matching process.
Thus job dissatisfaction, as the root cause of in￿ ation, is positively correlated with
unemployment and so would be inconsistent with the standard Phillips curve.
Structural unemployment is certainly a factor in the model, but it too is rooted
in job dissatisfaction
28. Mismatching causes output and income to fall as prices rise
and vulnerable technologies are outsourced
29. This can have a cumulative e⁄ect
27Retirement age is set at the average of life-expectancy and minimum life-expectancy.
28One can see how important job satisfaction is in this model by raising the percentage of good
jobs in the initial period. In￿ation virtually disappears from the system.
29Outsourcing takes place with or without in￿ation, so long as ￿nancing is not available.















Figure 4. Unemployment and job satisfaction
on the model and it is easy for the model to enter an unstable trajectory, with
outsourcing causing a decline in income which then leads to more outsourcing as
wealth declines. Foreign borrowing could no doubt prevent this in reality, but it is
not built into the model.
Figure 4 shows the path of unemployment over time in a characteristic run of
the model along with the level of job satisfaction. It is clear from this diagram
that the two series are highly negatively correlated (-0.795). It is evident that it
is not high wages that cause unemployment, but rather low wages that lead to
job-dissatisfaction. Since there is no guarantee that an agent will ￿nd another job
if she leaves one, the rate of unemployment can easily rise as a result.
Observe that the model more likely predicts ￿stag￿ ation￿than a pro￿t squeeze
on the level of investment. A pro￿t-squeeze is possible, however, in the following
sense. At the existing wage, let expenses rise to cause less job satisfaction, say as a
result of a demographic bubble. More movement comes about and output falls as
agents seek more remunerative jobs but are not uniformly successful. As a result,
unemployment rises and aggregate wealth falls, which in turn increases the rate of
cell death. Unemployment then increases structurally, initiated by a pro￿t squeeze.
There is an additional factor at play in the model, a skill mismatch. If an
agent is a graduate, yet the cell does not require a graduate, she may experience
job dissatisfaction despite that her income exceeds expenses. If she moves as a
result, she may not ￿nd another job and the unemployment rate might increase
temporarily. Moreover, when good jobs are not plentiful, wealthy but less educated
agents can make a decision to return to school and may earn a degree
30. If the
demand for graduate labor does not increase in the meantime, the new graduate may
become unemployed during an extended search for a satisfactory job. Aggregate
30The probability of not ￿nishing any given year is currently set to 20% and the wealth con-
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Figure 5. Gini coe¢ cient versus time
wealth will fall, in turn, and cause the economy to contract or at least to slow its
rate of growth.
3.2. Income distribution and growth. It appears that an inegalitarian distrib-
ution of income is an emergent property of the model, as it is in many agent based
models of income distribution (Axtell et al., 2001). In this section, we explore the
e⁄ect of the initial distribution of income and also risk in the rate of return to
accumulated wealth.
In the same run that generated ￿gure 4, the Phillips curve is vertical with little
in￿ ation. The initial distribution of good jobs is the same as in Figure 2 above
and by the end of the 50-year period, only 57% of the population is in a satisfying
job. The economy grows rapidly with per capita income increasing by 2:1% per
year. Figure 5 shows four paths of the Gini coe¢ cient. The two solid sequences
have an initially egalitarian distribution of wealth, but for the solid upper sequence,
economy-wide total pro￿t is distributed in proportion to wealth. In the lower, total
pro￿t is distributed in proportion to wealth plus a random term with approximately
equal weights31. The same is true of the upper and lower dashed sequences.
Note ￿rst that the initial conditions matter to the path of the Gini, but quickly
dampen out. For both, the Gini coe¢ cients paths are similar after about 25 years.
Initial equalities disappear after only a generation. The random factor in the rate
of return seems to be more important.Figure 6 shows a typical run of the model.
There the ￿poor￿are de￿ned as agents with less than 20% of the average wealth
of the ￿rich￿ , in turn de￿ned as the top 20% of the population. Note that at time
0, all agents have the same total wealth and so all 48 are rich. The number of
poor is increasing fairly dramatically in this simulation, suggesting rising relative
31Shares are determined by randomly assigning each agent a number between -0.15 and 0.85
and then normalizing by the sum. The agent￿ s share is then determined by an exogenously
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Figure 7. Wealth distribution (t = 10)
poverty. The distribution of wealth is shown in ￿gures 7, 8 and 9 after 10, 30 and
50 periods. Over time, the distribution of wealth approaches the Pareto or power
law distribution. It is clear from how the R2 increases that the power law does
not apply in the early stages of the development of the distribution of wealth but
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Figure 9. Wealth distribution (t = 50)
Why does the distribution of income deteriorate in this economy so de￿nitively?
Table 1 provides some preliminary answers. Analyzing the cross-sectional wealth
correlations at the beginning, middle and end of the simulated period, it is evident
that the strongest correlation between wealth is for property income. Correlation
coe¢ cients when t = 10; with agent population that increased from 48 to 55 are
shown in the ￿rst column. When property income is distributed in strict proportionMAS APPROACH TO MICRO FOUNDATIONS 19
Table 1. Wealth correlations
Correlation coe¢ cients1
t = 10 (n = 55) t = 30 (n = 74) t = 50 (n = 97)
Age 0.77 0.67 0.56
Property income 1 0.85 0.96
Skill 0.69 0.55 0.54
Graduate -0.09 0.06 0.09
Experience 0.47 0.47 0.46
Mobility -0.18 -0.05 -0.07
Education -0.1 -0.05 -0.05
Expenses 0.43 0.46 0.29
School prob -0.45 -0.28 -0.27
Share 0.43 0.19 0.14
Wage income 0.4 0.4 0.24
Experience here 0.54 0.49 0.53
Source: Model computations. 1. Property income distributed in
proportion to wealth.
to wealth, the correlation of age and wealth in this case is 0.77. Property income is
initially distributed in proportion to initial wealth and the run has not had enough
time to upset this balance; thus, the correlation between the two rounds to one.
Note that the skill and experience variables are all relatively highly correlated with
wealth accumulation, while the mobility and educational variables are not. Indeed,
mobility is negatively correlated, as is education and school probability.
With a more randomized rate of return on accumulated wealth, the outcome is
slightly di⁄erent. Property income is no longer as strongly correlated with wealth,
but experience is. This suggests that the most important factor in wealth accumu-
lation is obtaining a good job and keeping it. A good job is, of course, one that
covers the agent￿ s expenses while at the same time generating su¢ cient pro￿t to
attract capital to expand.
The reinforcement learning model driving mobility shows that moving from job
to job in this model is not a wealth enhancing strategy. Agent mobility decreases
over time as a result. Neither, surprisingly, is education correlated with wealth
accumulation. Here agents choose to return to school as a reactive strategy, when
they become dissatis￿ed with their jobs. School then is costly to wealth, both
directly and as an opportunity cost. Obtaining a job once one has completed
school is also di¢ cult since while the job search is enhanced, those who remain at
work accumulate experience that puts them into a strong competitive position. In
the longer run, of course, it is still better to be a graduate than not. Militants are
not wealthy in the model.
Growth in this model depends on technological change and capital accumulation,
as in virtually any economic model. Growth comes from resources not consumed20 BILL GIBSON
Table 2. Wealth correlations (con￿ t)
Correlation coe¢ cients1
t = 10 (n = 55) t = 30 (n = 74) t = 50 (n = 97)
Age 0.70 0.84 0.77
Property income 0.45 0.52 0.42
Skill 0.56 0.55 0.76
Graduate -0.22 -0.15 0.13
Experience 0.44 0.65 0.66
Mobility -0.07 -0.04 -0.19
Education -0.32 -0.23 0.05
Expenses 0.22 0.09 0.36
School prob -0.27 -0.28 -0.37
Share 0.33 0.38 -0.06
Wage income 0.5 0.23 0.49
Experience here 0.46 0.45 0.74
Source: Model computations. 1. Property income distributed in
proportion to wealth with a uniformly distributed random error.
and is directed to technologies with labor suited to it. Outsourcing, which is en-
dogenous in the model, is the result of slow technological progress or consumption
patterns inconsistent with technological change.
4. Conclusions
The question addressed in this paper is whether a multi-agent system generates
recognizable macroeconomic properties. Since the work of Debreu and others in
the 1970s, it is has been widely recognized that the Walrasian system cannot be
trusted to provide analytical microfoundations for Keynesian macroeconomics. One
cannot assume that atomistic agents with full information will necessarily gener-
ate an aggregate excess demand function that is downward sloping, even though
the demand curves for individual agents are. In response, economists have moved
away from both the Keynesian and Walrasian framework in search of more robust
and realistic models (Colander, 2003),(Gibson, 2003). Agent-based models are an
alternative, but nothing constrains these systems to look like a real macroecon-
omy when aggregated. There are no demand or supply curves here, no markets
in the traditional sense and no auctioneer as in the standard model. There are
only technologies available and agents must operate them successfully or face eco-
nomic extinction. Whether agents look for and ￿nd better technologies depends on
whether they are satis￿ed with what they are doing at the moment32. Operating a
32Consider this letter to the editor in the New York Times.
Yesterday I was o⁄ered a tech-suuport job for a publicly traded company. It pays a paltry $9
to $10 hour. When I squawked that this is not a livable wage, I was hesitantly o⁄ered $11.75...no
bene￿ts...I added up the cost of the two-hour-a-day commute, a mortgage on an average home,
health insurance...home and auto insurance and utilities. The break-even point was $10.35. Take
into account laundry, groceries, clothing and other basic expenses, and I am working at a de￿cit...MAS APPROACH TO MICRO FOUNDATIONS 21
technology requires ￿nancing, available from a ￿nancial system that channels sav-
ings from agents to cells. Rates of return on savings can be more or less risky, and
wealthy agents generally do a better job at ￿nding high-paying jobs, perpetuating
inequality.
Broadly speaking, the multi-agent system is capable of generating persistent
unemployment and in￿ ation as one typically sees in macroeconomies. It also occa-
sionally becomes unstable. When agents demand higher wages than technologies
can support, the con￿ ict generates in￿ ation. But unemployment is the result of job
dissatisfaction, not a shortage of e⁄ective aggregate demand simply because there is
no aggregate demand in the model of which to be short. If unsold goods remain on
the shop shelves, the Keynesian model shows an increase in unintended inventory
accumulation. The same takes place here, but since there are no ￿rms to react in
any way, these unsold goods get recycled into other technologies and are resold in
future periods.
There is excess technological capacity in the sense that the economy could pro-
duce more with a better ￿t between agents and their blueprints, but there is no
excess ￿nancial capacity. If there is inadequate ￿nancing, processes disappear; if
there is a surplus, agents ￿nd a way to use it.
The emergence and persistence of high Gini coe¢ cients is traced here to a simple
rule similar to what drives the Schelling neighborhood model. If computation is
costly in terms of foregone earnings on the part of both agents and cells, if follows
that those who are able to minimize search time by ￿nding a good job early and
keeping it will be better o⁄ in the long run. Policy that does not address this fun-
damental fact of modern market economies will ￿nd that solutions to distributional
inequality are di¢ cult to implement and will have disappointing results.
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